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A JUDGE FOR ALL SEASONS
R. KENT NEWMYER*

[Marshall] has done more to establish the Constitution of the
United States on sound construction than any other man
living.
John Quincy Adams'
He would have been deemed a great man in any age, and of all
ages.
Joseph Story2
[I]f American law were to be represented by a single figure,
sceptic [sic] and worshipper alike would agree without dispute
that the figure could be but one alone, and that one, John
Marshall.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.3
Holmes was right-The evidence that John Marshall is the
representative figure of American law is overwhelming. What was
true in 1901 remains true today. There is a paradox involved,
however, the kind Holmes himself loved to ponder as something
that "would take the scum off your mind."' The paradox is that
Marshall's reputation for greatness appears to exceed the scope of
* Professor of Law and History, University of Connecticut. This work appeared
originally as the epilogue to Prof. Newmyer's recent Marshall biography, JohnMarshall
and the Heroic Age of the Constitution.
1. 8 JOHN QTiNcY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 315 (Books for Libraries
Press 1969) (Charles F. Hobson ed., 1877).
2. Joseph Story, Life, Character,and Services of ChiefJustice Marshall (Oct. 15, 1835),
in 3 JOHN MAFSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTERAND JUDICIAL SERVICES 369 (John F. Dillon ed., 1903).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall:InAnswer to a Motion that the CourtAdjourn,
on February4, 1901, the One HundredthAnniversary of the Day on which Marshall Took His
Seat as ChiefJustice, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920).
4. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 22, 1921), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LEM"ERS 302 (Atheneum 1963) (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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his juridical accomplishments. "IfI were to think of John Marshall
simply by numbers and measure in the abstract," Holmes opined,
"I might hesitate in my superlatives."5 He had a point. Concede that
Marshall was a workhorse for the Court, that he spoke for the
majority in forty-nine percent of all the cases heard during his
tenure, in fifty-nine percent of all the constitutional law decisions,
and in almost all of the leading ones.6 The fact remains that only a
handful of these opinions were truly memorable. As Holmes put it,
"Remove a square inch of mucous membrane, and the tenor will sing
no more."' Take away any three of Marshall's great opinions-say
Marbury,8 McCulloch,9 and Gibbons1°-and it would be difficult to
argue that he was the constitutional lawgiver of all time. Keep in
mind, also, that his circuit opinions, though competent, were not
notable for pioneering new doctrine, as, for example, were those of
Story on the New England circuit. Beyond Marshall's opinions,
there is mainly the massive biography of George Washington in its
various editions. Although it is better history than once was
thought, it is remembered, when it is, more for what it reveals about
Marshall than about Washington. In any case, the biography has
little bearing on Marshall's legal reputation. Unlike other famous
statesmen of the early Republic, Marshall's extant correspondence
is decidedly minimalist, more like Lincoln's slender opus than that
of Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Hamilton, or Washington. Nor was
Marshall a legal educator as was his teacher George Wythe, or
David Hoffman of Maryland, or his colleague Story. This leaves only
the eleven polemical essays written in defense of McCulloch.
Brilliant and revealing of Marshall's legal acuity as they are, they
do not warrant comparison in terms of legal learning to St. George
Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, James Kent's
four-volume Commentaries on American Law, or Story's dozen
volumes of legal and constitutional commentaries. Even in the area
of constitutional law, there was some measure of truth in Holmes's
5. Holmes, supra note 3, at 267.
6. Robert G. Seddig, John Marshalland the Origins of Supreme CourtLeadership,36 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 805 (1975).
7. Holmes, supra note 3, at 267.
8. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
10. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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assessment that "after Hamilton and the Constitution itself,"
Marshall had little truly original to offer and not much beyond "a
strong intellect, a good style, personal ascendancy in his court,
courage, justice and convictions of his party."'
Beyond this grudging concession, Holmes offered little to resolve
the paradox of Marshall's greatness, except for one keen heuristic
insight: that like other great men, Marshall "represented a great
ganglion in the nerves of society" and was "a strategic point in the
campaign of history, and part of his greatness consists in his being
there."2 Like others of the founding generation, Marshall was
fortunate to have lived in, an age that not only permitted but invited
bold and creative statesmanship. Like Erick Erickson's young
man Luther, however, Marshall was not only energized by the
remarkable age in which he lived but modified its rich legacy, and,
to steal a phrase from Benjamin Cardozo, he molded it creatively"in
the fire of his own intense convictions." 3 Contrary to his own
modest assessments of his career, what Marshall created has to a
remarkable degree withstood the ravages of time. Not only has his
reputation for greatness survived, but it has, if anything, taken on
mythical proportions. It is the myth of Marshall's greatness that
now needs to be explicated, if it can be.
JOHN MARSHALL ON JOHN MARSHALL

The Chief Justice died in Philadelphia July 6, 1835, a few months
short of eighty years of age, brought down by an ailment that had
plagued him for several years. Present during the final hours were
his sons, except for Thomas, who, unbeknownst to his father, died
in a freak accident on his way to join his brothers. Marshall's death
was not a surprise. Though he continued to perform his duties on
the Court, it was clear to family and friends and to Marshall himself
that the end was approaching. He had long since put his affairs in
order, with an eye as always to providing for his family. On April 9,
1832, after the death of his wife, he revised his earlier will, which
had come down hard on James for his improvident ways. John
11. Holmes, supra note 3, at 269.
12. Id. at 267-68.

13. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 170 (1921).
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Marshall bequeathed the family place at Oak Hill, plus other lands,
to Thomas. Other extensive holdings, including "the slaves on the
land," were parceled out fairly to Jaquelin, James Keith, and
Edward Carrington. The Chickahominy plantation, "with all the
slaves stock, and plantation utensils, thereon," and his Richmond
properties, along with "slaves and household furniture," went in
trust to his daughter Mary and her children, "so as to protect her
and them from distress, whatever casualties may happen." Smaller
bequests, including bank stock and land, went to various nephews
and grandchildren, including 1000 acres "to each of my grandson's
[sic] named John." To his "faithful servant Robin," Marshall
bequeathed emancipation "ifhe chuses [sic] to conform to the laws
on that subject requiring that he should leave the state, or if
permission can be obtained for his continuing, to reside in it." If
Robin chose Liberia, he was to receive a hundred dollars; if he chose
to remain a slave, he could choose his master from among the
Marshall children.14
With his family generously provided for, Marshall was free to
continue his work on the Court and grapple with his own illness,
which he did without complaint and, according to Story, with a
stubborn disregard of his doctor's orders. Throughout his waning
years, as throughout his life, he remained casual about his
reputation.15 He labored to complete the two-volume edition of the
Washington biography and even began to plan for a one-volume
student edition, but he seemed less concerned about his reputation
as a biographer than about spreading the word of Washington's
relevance to the new age. One slight vanity was his quaint and
touching wish that at least one of his grandsons should be named
John. Friend and foe alike, however, attested to his modesty, his
"plain and unpretending" manner, and his republican simplicity.
This is not to suggest he doubted his own ability. He could not
have sallied forth so valiantly in defense of his version of
constitutional truth and justice, or stayed the course so long, had he
14. Marshall's revised"last will and testament" (Apr. 9,1832), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MAI1ALL(forthcoming 2002). For a brief history of The MarshallPapersproject, see S. Dean
Olson, A CollectionAfter All These Years, WM. & MARY MAG., Fall 1997, at 28-31.
15. Letter from Joseph Story to Richard Peters (May 20, 1835), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERs OF
JOSEPH STORY, at 194 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
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been plagued with self-doubt. The substance and tone of his
opinions bespoke his conviction and his determination to educate
posterity to republican verities, to leave future generations a
Constitution that was adequate to the "various crises of human
affairs." 6 But his opinions, though they bore the imprint of his
genius, were also, as he acknowledged, collective efforts. He was
determined to shun "paltry vanity," as he once put it, and made no
effort to save his papers, doubting whether the written record of his
life was "worth communication or preserving." True to his word, he
pored over his "old papers" in the spring of 1833 "to determine how
many of them were worthy of being committed to the flames."" The
letters that survived, found mostly in the papers of others, are
devoid of puffery and self-justification, or even self-explanation.
There are a couple brief autobiographical letters, plus a somewhat
fuller one to Story, written at his request. There are the impressive
journals Marshall kept while he was in Paris, relating mainly to the
XYZ negotiations. But there is no personal diary, no memoir or
journal, like those kept by Washington, John Adams, and John
Quincy Adams, recording his thoughts or explaining himself to
posterity. Unlike Webster, he did not quest for fame. Jefferson listed
his greatest accomplishments on his tombstone; Marshall wanted
only his name and dates, those of his parents, and, no doubt most
important to him, the fact that he was the husband of Mary Willis
Ambler. At his request, he was buried beside her in the "New
Burying Ground" on Shockoe Hills.
Marshall's self-abnegation, so apparent in all he did and said,
stemmed from a quality rare among the great men of the early
Republic: he was a genuinely modest man. The more famous he
became, the more modest he grew. What Thomas Babington
Macaulay said of John Hampden fits Marshall exactly: He was "an
almost solitary instance of a great man who neither sought nor
shunned greatness, who found glory only because glory lay in the
plain path of duty."'8 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
final years of his correspondence. As the end of his life approached,
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819).
17. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Apr. 24,1833), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 14.
18. 3 THoiAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, CRTIcALAND HISTORICAL ESSAYS 2(1907).
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letters of admiration from old friends and admirers poured in;
honors of all sorts, too numerous to list, were bestowed in
recognition of his life's work. For him, it was a period of
introspection and retrospection. There were tender and solicitous
letters to Polly, and on the anniversary of her death in 1832, the
heart-wrenching "Eulogy for Mary W. Marshall," celebrating the
remembrance of their love and their life together.19 Old friendships
assumed a new meaning-witness his generous words of praise to
his political opponent James Monroe for a life lived in honorable
service to his country. 0 With Lafayette, another veteran of the
American Revolution, Marshall shared his thoughts on slavery,
emancipation, and the American Colonization Society. The irascible
Timothy Dickering wrote to pay his respects and, characteristically,
to pass judgment on American society past and present. Marshall
responded kindly, though he did not hesitate to express his "real
veneration & respect for Mr. [John] Adams," whom Dickering
continued to savage.2 ' Past disagreements were forgotten and
forgiven, no doubt, when Dickering praised "the Supreme Federal
Judiciary" as "the high Controlling Authority, the Moral Scepter, of
the Nation."22 Marshall also went out of his way to make peace with
another Salem resident, Samuel P. P. Fay, whom he had written
under the mistaken notion that his son Edward had become
engaged to Fay's daughter. Reading Marshall's delicate and
diplomatic apology, one can understand why he succeeded so
brilliantly in the XYZ mission.2"

19. Marshall's correspondence to his wife is printed in FRANCES NORTON MASON, MY
DEAREST POLLY: LETrERS OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL TO HIS WIFE, wriH THEIR
BACKGROUND, POLIcALAND DoMEsTIc (1961). It will also be available in 11 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 14. His "Eulogy" of Dec. 25, 1832 appears on 324-44 of Mason's
book, and will also be available in 11 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supranote 14.
20. Letter from John Marshall to James Monroe (Mar. 7, 1825), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 134-35 (Charles F. Hobson ed., 2000); Letter from John Marshall to James
Monroe (Dec. 13, 1824), id. at 151.
21. Letter from John Marshall to Timothy Pickering (May 31, 1824), in 10 PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 20, at 90.
22. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Marshall (Jan. 2, 1828) (misdated 1827 by
Pickering), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 14.
23. Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Fay (Sept. 15, 1826), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 20, at 302-03; Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Fay, (Oct. 15,
1826), id. at 309-11.
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Marshall also responded patiently to the inquiries of friends and
strangers and to the various materials sent him, ranging from
Horace Binney's eulogy of Chief Justice Tilghman to Alexander
Smyth's proposal to limit the term of president to one term, which
in light of Andrew Jackson, Marshall thought might be worth a
try. Everyone wanted the great man's blessing, which he seemed
so willing to bestow. Marshall wrote as a "Virginian" in response
to James M. Garnett's address to the Agricultural Society at
Fredericksburg about the "causes & remedies" of Virginia's "present
discontents." It is not clear what Garnett liked most, agricultural
reform or female education, but Marshall liked both causes.2" He sat
for several portraits by well-known painters such as Rembrandt
Peale, John Wesley Jarvis, Chester Harding, and Henry Inman."
He received fellow Washington scholar and future president of
Harvard Jared Sparks, who came away in awe of Marshall's
republican personality, the blending into a consistent whole, as
Sparks put it, of "all things about him, his house, grounds, office,
himself," and how they all "bear marks of a primitive simplicity and
plainness rarely to be seen combined.""
And on it went. What the correspondence reveals is what Sparks
described, a humble great man at peace with himself and with those
around him. One of Marshall's last letters, to John Marshall Jr.,
distilled a life experience for the edification of his grandson:
Happiness is pursued by all; though too many mistake the road
by which this greatest good is to be successfully followed. Its
abode is not always in the palace or the cottage. Its residence is
the human heart, and its inseparable companion is a quiet
conscience. Ofthis Religion is the surest and safest foundation.2 7

24. Letter from John Marshall to Horace Binney (Nov. 19, 1827), in 11 PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 14; Letter from John Marshall to James M. Garnett (Dec. 17, 1830),
11 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supranote 14; Letter from John Marshall to Thomas W. White
(Nov. 29, 1824), in 10 PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 20, at 124-25.
25. ANDREW OLIvER, THE PORTRAITS OF JOHN MARSHALL 48-53, 54-62, 63-82, 134-62
(1977).
26. Interview by John Marshall with Jared Sparks, Richmond, Va. (Apr. 1, 1826), in 10
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 20, at 283-84.

27. Letter from John Marshall to John Marshall, Jr. (Nov. 7,1834), in 11 PAPERS OFJOHN
MARSHALL, supra note 14.
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If Marshall's conscience was quiet in the assurance he had done
his best, it also troubled him deeply that it was not enough to save
the country he loved so much. Indeed, behind his disregard of
reputation was his sincere belief that his life's work was a failure,
that the Court was weakened beyond repair and that without the
Court to defend it, the Constitution itself was doomed. Fame goes to
history's winners, and Marshall saw himself on the losing side as
the American people repudiated his conservative version of the
Revolution in their mad embrace of political democracy. The more
he feared the irrationality of the electorate and the demagogic
excess of politicians north and south of the Mason-Dixon Line, the
closer he clung to the conservative wisdom of the eighteenth
century. His law-and-order Revolution had turned radical. What
was once the "revolutionary center" was fast becoming the
revolutionary fringe, and that is where Marshall placed himself. For
the most part, his view was accurate.
What was true of politics was also true of constitutional law.
Increasingly the "sovereign people" of the states, armed with "local
knowledge" and urged into action by political parties, called the
shots. With the help of Martin Van Buren's organizing genius,
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian democracy had prevailed over Marshallian
conservatism. The Court, which in Marshall's scheme of things was
supposed to curb popular democracy, had been "revolutionized" by
it. During his last years in office, he experienced the beginning of
the transformation of constitutional law the Taney Court would
carry to completion. Increasingly he feared the civil war that finally
came. In one important respect, the war itself was the final blow to
Marshall's dream of a law-abiding, Court-obeying republic.
Perhaps there is no sadder or more telling symbol of the failure
than one of Alexander Gardner's photographs: the shallow grave of
a soldier at the foot of a battle-shattered tree, the tree silhouetted
against the sky. Beneath the tree's fractured branches stand
several soldiers, leaning battle weary on their rifles or standing
strangely at attention. The photograph was taken after Antietam's
bloody work was done. The dead soldier, from the Twenty-eighth
Pennsylvania Volunteers, was Private John Marshall. The unfortunate soldier was not a namesake, but in an age famous for
remembering famous men, he easily could have been. In any case,
the image conveys a sad truth: What Marshall had feared, what he
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had worked to avoid, had come to pass. The rule of law as a rational
way of settling disputes had given way, first to emotion and
ideological extremism in the North and South, then to the lord of
battles. The Union he hoped to preserve by adhering to the
Constitution had gone to war over its meaning. His own state,
indeed his own grandchildren, fought against the nation he had
fought to create. Out of the bloody conflict would come a new
birth of freedom, to be sure, and the Union, stronger for having
endured the stress of civil war, would endure. But the new age was
light-years removed from Marshall's world and hostile to much that
was dear to him. Ironically, it was this pulsating, chaotic age that
bestowed
on him its highest honors and the fame he doubted would
28
be his.

THE MARSHALL MYTH AND THE MODERN NATION-STATE

Marshall died thinking he had become marginalized, and judging
by the course of antebellum history and law, in some ways he had.
Ironically, however, it was during this period that the myth of his
greatness began to take shape. Admittedly, the mythmakers had
much to work with. Such qualities as decency, modesty, kindness,
patriotism, and genius count immensely, and friend and foe alike
agreed that he had all of them in abundance. It would be difficult to
find another statesman of his period who was so universally loved
as a person and equally difficult to identify another statesman
whose personal qualities so neatly meshed with the transitional age
in which he lived. Marshall was a born aristocrat, whose democratic
demeanor fit the democratic age he disliked so much. He was an
American who loved Virginia, a southerner celebrated by the North.
He was a genuinely great man who was genuinely modest, a
combination that was "irresistibly winning," as even his old foes at
the Richmond Enquirer conceded in their touching eulogy.2 9 The
28. The photograph of Marshall's grave appears in Michael Kernan's The Pictures That
Stunned the North, CIVILIZATION, MariApr. 1995, at 70-71. The John Marshall in the picture
was a fifty year-old Irish immigrant who enlisted in July 1861. For more on the photograph,
see WILLiAA. FRASSANATO, ANTIETAM: THE PHOTOGRAPHIC LEGACYOF AMERICA'S BLOODIEST
DAY 171-74 (1978). Mason noted in My DearestPoUy that of the five sons of Marshall's son
James, four "served in the army that marched to oppose the military invasion of the State of
Virginia." MASON, supra note 19, at 320.
29. For the eulogy printed in the Richmond Enquireron July 10, 1835, see 4 ALBERT J.
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Americans who lined the roads to celebrate his triumphant return
from France and the XYZ mission got the point early on: In a
country still unsure of itself or its destiny, one that was moving
from a traditional social order to a new egalitarian one, he was a
natural-born American hero. The more he refused the accolade, the
more he was revered. This is not yet to mention his life's work on
the Supreme Court and the mysterious way he blended his
republican personality with the institution over which he presided
for thirty-four years. Less than two weeks after his death, the
outpouring of grief and praise in all sections of the country over his
death prompted the National Gazette of Philadelphiato conclude
the whole nation held its dead Chief Justice "in almost universal
veneration." Even as the political debate heated up about who
should replace him, evidence was pouring in that "the fame of a
good man" would be impervious to "censure." Marshall was on his
way to becoming not just a national hero but a national institution,
in both respects, according to some, second only to Washington. For
Americans inclined to think in providential terms, it must have
seemed entirely appropriate that the famed Liberty Bell, which once
tolled independence, cracked while tolling Marshall's death and
went entirely silent sixteen years later ringing the anniversary of
Washington's birth.30
In reading the many eulogies praising Marshall's work, one might
forget that his jurisprudence, in contrast to his character, was not
universally admired. Indeed, in the months and years following his
death, periodicals and newspapers across the nation hotly debated
key aspects of his constitutional legacy. Ironically, however, even
the Chief Justice's detractors contributed to the myth of his
greatness, none more so than Thomas Jefferson and other Virginia
states' rightists who opposed Marshall every step of the way. The
point they made publicly and privately, year after year from his
appointment in 1801 on, was that he had single-handedly and
single-mindedly made the Supreme Court over in his own image and
BEVERmDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 589 (1919).
30. Julian P. Boyd, Liberty Bell, in 3 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 271 (James
Truslow Adams ed., 2d rev. ed. 1942); see also John Baer Stoudt, The Liberty Bells of
Pennsylvania, 37 THE PENNSYLVANIA GERMAN SOCIETY: PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES AT
PHILADELPHIA, OCTOBER 8, 1926 (1930); Franklin Institute, Report of the Committee for the
Preservation of the Liberty Bell (1962).
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used it to create a consolidated, that is to say, a Hamiltonian,
nation-state with a judge-made Constitution to match. Marshall
mythmakers such as Beveridge had only to praise the qualities in
Marshall that contemporary critics condemned.3 '
Southern critics also contributed to the Marshall mythology by
calling forth the commercial interests north of the Mason-Dixon
Line to defend him and, in the process, put their own gloss on his
jurisprudence and his reputation. Take, for example, the great
commercial city of Philadelphia, whose populace first welcomed
back the conquering hero of XYZ and whose lawyers dominated the
Supreme Court bar for many years. No professional group was more
distinguished or better placed to know Marshall and none more
ardent in his praise. The great men and distinguished lawyers of the
city gathered in the county courtroom for the memorial service
presided over by Stephen DuPonceau, Philadelphia's legal scholar
-in-residence. Leading the chorus of mournful praise were Horace
Binney and John Sergeant, two of the city's most influential
lawyers. Members of the bar association turned out to pay their
final respects as Marshall's body was transported to the boat that
would carry it home to Richmond. The conservative press, which
praised the honest republican lawyer for putting Talleyrand in his
place, now praised the dead Chief Justice for rescuing the nation
and making it safe for capitalism. So did the legal profession and
the commercial press of New York City. James Kent, the "American
Blackstone," said it all when he journeyed to Richmond in May to
pay his final respects. Kent wrote to Jeremiah Smith, one of New
England's most formidable common lawyers, about the experience,
and Smith spoke for both men and no doubt for most northern
lawyers. Marshall's views of national affairs and national law were
"perfectly just in themselves," he declared, and "now come to us
confirmed by the dying attestation of the greatest and best of

31. Less than two weeks after Marshall's death, the Whiggish NationalGazette blasted
the Democratic New York Evening Post for its criticism of Marshall's jurisprudence and its
call for a Democratic Chief Justice. One of the most interesting evaluations of the shift in
jurisprudence after 1837 is found at 46 N. Att. REV. 126-56 (Jan. 1838). For the debate over
the Marshall legacy and the future of the Court, see chapter 21 of 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1937).
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men." 2 Where commerce, industry, and capitalism flourished, it
would seem, so did the memory and reputation of John Marshall.
Nowhere was the celebratory prose more lavish or the
mythmaking machinery better oiled than in New England. The
more Virginia criticized Marshall, the more New England loved him.
Massachusetts led the way and with much reason. After all, it was
native son John Adams who appointed Marshall to the Court and
who considered it one of the most important accomplishments of his
accomplished life. John Quincy Adams shared his father's views,
praising and defending Marshall whenever he got the chance, which
happened often in the 1820s. New England capitalists such as the
Cabots and Lowells-and the Appletons, Lees, and Jacksons-paid
Marshall the ultimate compliment by putting his ideas about
corporations into practice in the Merrimack Valley. The formidable
intellectual establishment of Massachusetts chimed in, too,
especially in the 1820s, when New England conservatives mobilized
to stamp out the Jeffersonian democratic states' rights heresy. In
this conservative, countercultural revolution, Marshall and his
nationalist law figured prominently. Articles and reviews praising
him were regular features of the influential NorthAmerican Review,
the voice of New England conservatism, after the journal's creation
in 1815." 3 Leading intellectuals, such as Jared Sparks, and religious
leaders, such as William Ellery Charming, joined the chorus of
praise.
Primarily, however, it was the legal community of New England
and Massachusetts that canonized Marshall. Its partiality is not
surprising, given the fact that its members contributed significantly
3 4 Dartmouth College,3 5
to his opinions in such cases as Fletcher,
3
McCulloch,' andGibbons," to mention only some. Webster provided
grist for Marshall's mill in the latter three opinions, and in Gibbons,
he shared nearly equal billing. Mainly, however, it was Joseph Story
32. BEVERIDGE, supra note 29, at 586-87.
33. See HARLowW. SHEIDLEY, SECTIONAL NATIONALISM: MASSACHUSETIS CONSERVATIVE
LEADERS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA (1815-1836) 97-117 (1998) (discussing the
editorial goals and impact oftheNorthAmericanReview); see also R. KENTNEWMYER, JUSTICE
JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBUC 155-95 (1985).

34.
35.
36.
37.

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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who took charge of Marshall's reputation. Story did not live to
complete the full biography of Marshall he hoped to write, but while
he lived, he spread the word of Marshall's good works; and as New
England's leading jurist, as the dominant figure on the New
England judicial circuit, as Dane Professor at Harvard Law School,
and as part of the elite junto that ran Harvard University, Story
was in a position to be heard. Story was a big talker, but he was also
a careful listener, and he paid attention when Marshall shared
information about his life. It was Story who persuaded Marshall to
write an autobiographical letter in 1827, the most extensive
personal account that exists." Story used the information in a
review of Marshall's A History of the Colonies,3 9 which appeared in
the NorthAmerican Review as ChiefJusticeMarshall'sPublicLife
and Services and which plugged Marshall more than his history.'
Throughout the 1820s, Story used his influence on and off the Court
to defend and praise Marshall. It is impossible to reconstruct Story's
innumerable conversations during this period or his lectures to
Harvard Law School students, but it is certain they were fulsome in
Marshall's praise. Story's eulogy on Marshall's death, delivered
before the Suffolk Bar on October 15, 1835, was the most touching
and informative of all the many memorials past and present. Widely
circulated in pamphlet form, it was reprinted in William W. Story's
The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story1 and again in John
Dillon's three-volume collection of essays celebrating the centennial
of Marshall's ascension to the Court in 1901.42
More important in furthering Marshall's fame was Story's
three-volume Commentarieson the Constitution,3 written to refute
his states' rights critics. Story dedicated the work to Marshall in a
long, heartfelt letter of praise, predicting, "[p] osterity will assuredly
38. Marshall's letter to Story is printed as AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY JOHN
MAIRSHALL (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937). Adams traces the provenance of the letter in his

introduction.
39. JoHN MARsH.LL, A HISTORY OF THE COLONIES (1824).
40. Joseph Story, Chief Justice Marshall's Public Life and Services, 16 N. AM. REV. 1
(1928).
41. THE MISCELLANEOUS WRTINGS OF JOSEPH STORY (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2000)
(William W. Story ed., 1852).
42. 3 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE CHARACTERAND JUDICIAL SERVICES, supra note 2, at 327-80.
43. JOSEPH STORY, COMIMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITIrON (Carolina Academic Press 1987)
(1833) (abridged by the author).
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confirm, by its deliberate award, what the present age has approved
as an act of undisputed justice."44 Marshall was the epic hero of this
epic work. Story cited his opinions often and at length, no small
advantage to lawyers who did not have access to the Supreme Court
Reports. Marshall's opinions also figured prominently in Story's
nineteen rules of construction,45 which were designed to keep the
Court in harmony with the intent of the Framers and guarantee its
nonpolitical legal character. Story's interpretation of the Court as
the salvation of the Republic put Marshall's lifetime work into
words. In its various editions, including ones for students and lay
adults, Story's Commentaries remained the leading text on the
Constitution well into the twentieth century. Readers over the years
came away believing that Marshall's name was synonymous with
constitutional wisdom. Thus when one aspiring Philadelphia lawyer
named Henry B. Pearson set out in 1840 to "render" the great truths
of the Constitution "plain and easy" to the youth of America, he
planned his book as an intimate dialogue between the benevolent
and all-wise Chief Justice and his fictional "son in law Horace. "4"
Indeed, in the years from 1815 to 1860 no fewer than five popular
textbooks for students celebrated Marshall as the model judicial
statesman.4 7 Adults got the same romantic message in Henry
Flanders's Lives of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, which portrayed Marshall as judge of Olympian
4
wisdom who stood above the partisan struggles of the age.
By fusing Marshall with the Supreme Court and the Court with
the Constitution, Story and other antebellum mythmakers laid the
foundation of his enduring fame. In the grand sweep of things,
however, it was the Civil War that clinched the matter. Marshall
sought desperately to avoid just such a war, but it was natural to
argue that the man who fought and judged for the new nation would
44. Id. at iii.
45. Id. §§ 178-215.
46. The eight-page prospectus of Pearson's unpublished books is in the Rare Book
Department of the Free Library of Philadelphia. Thanks to Morris Cohen of Yale Law School
for the reference.
47. MAXWELL BLOOmFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SocIETY (1776-1876) at
157-58 (1976) (discussing Marshall's popularity and his symbolic importance to lawyers who
were trying to upgrade the image of the legal profession).
48. 1 HENRY FLANDERS, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT

(William S. Hein & Co. 1971) (1881).
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have supported a war to preserve it. Beveridge made the connection
when he noted the similarities between Lincoln and Marshall.4 9
Lincoln worked to preserve what Marshall proclaimed in his
opinions. When Lincoln's Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase declared in
Texas v. White5" that the Union and the states that composed it were
indestructible,"1 he vindicated not just Marshall's constitutional
principles but his life's work. Harvard Law School's James Bradley
Thayer made the point in his John Marshall,published in 1901.52
"It was Marshall's strong constitutional doctrine," declared Thayer,
"explained in detail, elaborated, powerfully arued, over and over
again, with unsurpassable earnestness and force, [and] placed
permanently in our judicial records ... that saved the country from
succumbing, in the great struggle of forty years ago, and kept our
political fabric from going to pieces.""3 An attachment to states'
rights and a deep commitment to federalism had not disappeared,
of course, but secession and the threat of it was dead. On the wane,
too, was southern resistance to the market culture of the newly
united United States. Increasingly, the New South replaced the Old
South and set out to beat the industrial North at its own game.
Southern history was becoming American history, and both were
catching up with John Marshall and sweeping him along to
posthumous greatness.
With the cultural rapprochement between North and South,
Marshall's reputation became truly national-Holmes's undisputed
"representative figure of American law." Even the defeated South
joined the chorus of praise. This is not to say that southerners
abandoned states' rights or even the constitutional ideas of John C.
Calhoun, which inspire serious discussion to this day. There were
southerners immediately after the war who saw the irony of
praising Marshall the lawgiver after four years of law-defying war.
One such was Innes Randolph, who wrote the following poem in
1869 about the dedication of Marshall's statue in Richmond, the
capital of the defeated confederacy:
49. BLVERDGE, supra note 29, at 91-93, 344 (1919). But see JOHN BRAEMAN, ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE 304-07 (1971) (discussing Beveridge's criticism of Lincoln).
50. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868).

51. Id. at 724-26.
52. JAMES BRADLEYTHAYER, JOHN IASHALL (photo. reprint 1974) (1901).
53. Id. at 58-59.
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We are glad to see you, John Marshall, my boy,
So fresh from the chisel of Rodgers;
Go take your stand on the monument there,
Along with the other old codgers;
With Washington, Jefferson, Henry, and such,
Who sinned with a great transgression
In their old-fashioned notions of freedom and right
And their hatred of wrong and oppression.
You come rather late to your pedestal, John,
And sooner you ought to have been here,
For the volume you hold is no longer the law,
And this is no longer Virginia.
The old Marshall law you expounded of yore
Is now not at all to the purpose,
And the Martial Law of the Brigadier
Is stronger than habeas corpus.
So keep you the volume shut with care
For the days of the law are over;
And it needs all your brass to be holding it there
With "Justice" inscribed on the cover.
Could life awaken the limb of bronze
And blaze in the burnished eye,
What would you do with your moment of life?
Ye men of the days gone by!
Would ye chide us or pity us? blush or weep?
Ye men of the days gone by!
Would Jefferson roll up the scroll he holds
Which time has proven a lie?
Would Marshall close the volume of law
And lay it down with a sigh? 4
The main point, however, is not that Randolph sneered at
Marshall's faith in the rule of law, but that a statue to him was
erected in the former capital of the Confederacy. Richmond was
Marshall's home, and even when it was the intellectual capital of
states' rights, he was always loved. But a cursory sampling of the
literature suggests that Marshall was invited into the pantheon of
54. OLUVR, supra note 25, at 183-85 (quoting Randolph's poem).
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legal giants only gradually by southerners. During 1820s and 1830s,
southern theorists of all persuasions jumped on the anti-Marshall
bandwagon. Indeed, three years after Marshall's death, a writer in
the Southern Literary Messenger listed Virginia's legal greats
without even mentioning his name. After the Civil War, legal
reformers continued to attack the "moldy monstrosities" of his
procorporate, procapitalist opinions. By the time Alexander
Stephens published his A Constitutional View of the Late War
Between the States,55 however, things were changing. Since Stephens
was mainly interested in refuting Unionist constitutional theory,
he could hardly have praised the Marshall Court; indeed, he
hardly mentioned the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the old Chief
Justice did make a cameo appearance-as a champion of moderate
federalism who deserved a place of eminence alongside Roger
Taney. Judging by Henry St. George Tucker's attack on the General
Welfare Clause doctrine in the American Bar Association Journal
in 1927, southern theorists preferred to target Story rather than
Marshall,5 6 perhaps because it was mainly Story's Commentaries
that kept Marshall's ideas current. In any case, by that time, if not
long before, the Chief Justice had joined Washington and Madison
on Virginia's all-star team of national heroes.5 7
If the Civil War settled the federalism issue in Marshall's favor,
postwar economic history did the same for his law-based economic
preferences. Again he looked prophetic. The growth of a national
railroad system free from state interference was bolstered by
resuscitating the national market potential of Gibbons v. Ogden,
just as Dartmouth College was frequently cited to defeat state
economic regulation. Marshall and his Court also contributed subtly
to the rise of substantive due process by building the assumption
into American public law that the private business corporation
was just another enterprising individual whose property needed
protection from the encroachment of the state. Marshall's Contract
Clause decisions, though less important after the transformation of
55. 2 ALEXANDER STEPHENS, A CONSTIUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE
STATES; ITS CAUSES, CHARAcTERi, CONDUCT, AND RESULTS 261 (1870).

56. Henry St. George Tucker, Judge Story's Position on the So-Called General Welfare
Clause, 13 A.B.A. J. 363, 363-68, 465-69 (1927).
57. RiCHARD B. DAviS, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN JEFFERSON'S VIRGINIA, 1790-1830, at 363
(1972).
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment than
before, remained relevant until the Blaisdell" decision in 1934,
when the Court bent Article 1, Section 10, to the necessities of
the Great Depression. Though Lockner v. New York59 turned on
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, its contract
preferences were clearly those of Marshall.
Marshall's incorporation into the conservative constitutional
construct of the late nineteenth century helped consolidate his
mythic status. But it also produced a growing body of criticism,
which would not so much detract from his reputation as it would
alter it. As Paul W. Kahn has shown, the main thrust of constitutional theory after the Civil War was away from Marshall's
"maintenance theory" of constitutional law that the role of the Court
was to preserve the Constitution of 1787 against all comers by
adhering to the intent of the Framers as expressed in the text of the
document.6" After the Civil War, under the intellectual impact of
Darwinian science and the practical consequences of business
consolidation, the Constitution was increasingly looked upon as a
work in process; the process according to some was, or should be,
communal and democratic in nature, not judicial. Like Holmes,
Thayer saw Marshall as a man of his own age; Thayer was also
among the first to acknowledge that "we seem to be living in a
different world from Marshall's."61 The Court under Marshall aimed
its nationalist decisions at the Union-busting implications of states'
rights radicalism, while the late nineteenth-century Court aimed to
destroy the legislative will of the people, which aimed to curb
corporate excess. While Thayer did not criticize Marshall and,
indeed, found much to praise, he vigorously opposed the judicial
excesses of the late nineteenth-century Court done in Marshall's
name.62 Like Holmes and Frankfurter after him-and John
Bannister Gibson earlier, whose critique of Marshall Thayer cited

58. Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 409-15 (1934).
59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60. PAuL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 85-89 (1992).
61. JAmEs BRADLEYTHAYER, OLIVERWENDELLHOLmES, AND FELIXFRAN
REON JOHN
MARsHALL 83 (1967).
62. Id. at 84-88.
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with approval-Thayer argued that the Court worked best when it
restrained itself.6 3
Other less moderate critics of Marshall soon chimed in. One such
was Gustavus Myers, whose socialistHistory of the Supreme Court64
depicted the Marshall Court as part of the economic class struggle.
More influential was Charles Beard'sAn EconomicInterpretationof
the Constitution,' which claimed that the Constitution was largely
the creation of a consolidated capitalist class.' It followed logically
that if Marshall adhered to the intent of the Framers as he
claimed to do, then he was also part of the capitalist conspiracy. In
fact, Beard argued exactly that position in The Supreme Courtand
the Constitution," which appeared one year before Economic
Interpretation. Moreover, judicial review itself was part of the
Framers' intent, put in place, Beard argued, to implement capitalist
policy objectives he believed permeated the Constitution itself.6"
Edward Corwin, soon to become the nation's leading authority
on the Court, appeared to agree. By arguing that Marshall
deliberately went out of his way in Marbury to declare section 13
unconstitutional, Corwin suggested, as Jefferson had claimed
earlier, that Marshall had taken personal charge of American
constitutional history.69 Corwin also claimed that Marshall's
decision in the Burr treason trial was politically motivated. 0 The
Jeffersonian overtones of Corwin's scholarship became explicit, and
less scholarly, in Vernon Parrington's Main Currentsin American
Thought.7 Parrington viewed all of American history as the
unfolding of Jeffersonian democracy and accordingly dismissed
Marshall as a politically motivated judge whose main legacy was to
63. Id.
64. GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 228-354 (Charles H. Kerr & Co.
1925) (1912).
65. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTrUTION (1913).
66. Id. at 149-51.
67. CHARLES BEAID, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 119-27 (Prentice-HaU

Inc. 1962) (rev. ed. 1938). For a discussion of Beard's work, see id. at 1-34 (introduction by
Alan F. Westin).
68. Id. at 74-101.
69. Edward S. Corwin, The EstablishmentofJudicialReview, 9 MICH. L. REv. 102,292-94
(1910).
70. EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 86-120 (1919).

71. 2 VERNON Louis PAIRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT. AN
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN LITERATURE FROM THE BEGINNING TO 1920, at 20-27 (1927).
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give lawyers a monopoly on constitutional interpretation and fix a
Hamiltonian Constitution on an unwilling populace.72 This was also
the main thrust of two major studies of the Supreme Court, one by
Louis B. Boudin in 1932 and the second by Charles Grove Haines in
1960-both written from a Jeffersonian point of view."
Despite many keen insights and some needed perspective on
Marshall and his Court, these latter-day Jeffersonians did not carry
the day. One might even argue that the more irrelevant Marshall
appeared to the modern age, the more mythical he became. Thus, at
the very time Thayer of Harvard was attempting to put Marshall
back in his own age, John Fiske of Yale was elevating him to
mythical status. Fiske, like Thayer, believed in evolution. His grand
theme was Anglo-Saxon liberty under law, which he saw as the end
product of a process that began in the Teutonic forests of northern
Germany and climaxed in America, from whence it would
presumably conquer the world. The determining moment in this
great drama, as Fiske explained in his CriticalPeriodin American
History,' was the framing and ratification of the Constitution.
Marshall was too young to figure as a central character in this
happening, though he makes his debut at that time as a young
patriot marked for destiny. But as Chief Justice, according to Fiske,
Marshall was the original genius who melded the theories of
Jefferson and Hamilton into "a new form of political organization," 5
with judicial review as its foundation. By the time of his death in
1901, Fiske had concluded, in the words of his biographer, that
Marshall's contributions "were not inferior in value, to those of
Washington, in giving birth to the nation itself."'6 This appeared to
be the unanimous conclusion of the legal luminaries who celebrated
the centennial anniversary of Marshall's ascension to the Court in
1901. The published edition of these memorial speeches, which
include earlier eulogies by Story, Horace Binney, and others, marks

72. Id.
73. See Louis B. BOUDIN, GOVENmdENTBYJUDICIARY213-33 (1932) (challenging the pro-

Marshall works by Charles Warren and Albert Beveridge); CHARLES GRovEs HAINES, THE
ROLE OFTHE SUPREME COURT I AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAND POLITIcS 245-58 (1960) (same).
74. JOHN FISKE, CRIcTAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY 300-05 (Houghton Mifflin 1916)

(1888).
75. 2 JOHN SPENCER CLARK, THE LIFE AND LEITERS OF JOHN FISKE 492 (1917).

76. Id. at 492-93.
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the end of one century of hagiography and the beginning of
another. 7
The dominant figure in the second century of Marshall studies
was Albert Beveridge, whose four-volume life-and-times biography
appeared in 1919.78 The character of Beveridge, as well as the
quality of his scholarship, helps explain the commanding authority
his larger-than-life view of Marshall came to have. As a young man
growing up in hardscrabble times in Illinois, Beveridge came to view
Marshall-along with Lincoln-as the embodiment of his personal
values and those of America as well. Like Marshall and Lincoln,
Beveridge was both a lawyer and a politician. As Senator from
Illinois, he blended the ideals of democratic reform-first, as a
reform-minded Republican, then, after 1912, as a member of the
Progressive Party-with ideas of racial supremacy, which spilled
over into an aggressive America-first imperialism. When he lost the
congressional election of 1912, he became a full-time biographer of
Marshall. The project became the focus of his life-a surrogate
profession, as well as a vindication of the progressive, nationalist,
imperialist values that had gone down in defeat at the polls, as had
Marshall's. In Beveridge's skilled, hands, Marshall became the
embodiment of a triumphant but beleaguered Anglo-American
culture. With Marshall's "martial blood," his preference for English
culture, and American law and order, the fit seemed perfect.79
Despite his bias (perhaps because of it), Beveridge was a force to
reckon with. He was a dogged researcher, who set out to write the
"definitive" biography, based on the demanding standards of the
new "scientific history." Before he was finished, he had consulted
not only an impressive corpus of Marshall materials but many of the
leading political scientists and historians of the age as well. James
Franklin Jameson, the acknowledged leader of the profession and
champion of the "New History," was one of the first to lend his
support. Among others who critiqued Beveridge's work and
celebrated it upon publication were Charles Beard, Edward Corwin,
and Max Farrand of Yale, who had just published The Framingof
0 and would go on to edit Madison's
the Constitution"
The Records of
77. 1 JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 2 (collection of centenary and memorial addresses).
78. See generally 1-4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 29.
79. 4 id. at 1-58 (discussing Marshall's background).
80. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION (Yale Univ. Press 1962) (1911).
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the FederalConvention of 1787.1 Samuel Eliot Morison at Harvard,
already on his way to professional prominence, lent his name to the
project, as did the ubiquitous Harold Laski. Even William E. Dodd,
whose assessment of Marshall was conditioned by a strong liking for
Jefferson, got on board.8 2 With backers such as these, it is not
surprising that Beveridge's Life of John Marshallwas awarded the
Pulitzer Prize for biography in 1920.
Though never without its critics, Beveridge's biography
commanded the field of Marshall scholarship for much of the
twentieth century. According to Beveridge's dramatic rendering,
Marshall was as relevant to the modern age as he had been to his
own. Marshall was a nationalist and internationalist; so were
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. The production miracle
of modern America, as well as the laissez-faire capitalism of J.P.
Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller, appeared to rest on the legal
foundation laid by Marshall. For those who looked to an activist
Court to strike down "socialist" regulation of property at both the
state and national level, Marshall showed the way in Marbury,
Cohens,83 and his Contract Clause opinions. Marshall's love of
English culture resonated with an age in which England and
America reaffirmed their cultural affinity. The martial side of
Marshall's career-as a soldier, as a champion of military
preparedness, as a frank defender of American sovereignty and
American interests-also assumed a new relevance as the United
States joined Great Britain in a great war against Germany, which
happened precisely when Beveridge was putting the finishing
touches on volumes three and four of the biography. It did not hurt
either, in an age that saw the reunification of the North and South,
that Marshall the southerner should be harnessed to the chariot of
twentieth-century national and international greatness Beveridge
saw as the manifest destiny of America.
Beveridge's Marshall was a ready-made symbol for what many
modern Americans wanted to see in their lawmakers, perhaps in
themselves. The less they actually saw of John Marshall's world, it
seemed, the more they admired John Marshall. The evidence of his
81. JAMES MADISON, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937).
82. BRAEMAN, supra note 49, at 254-69.
83. Cohens v. Virgiia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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mythic status cannot be easily catalogued, but the common themes
of the tributes to him, combined with their scope and diversity, is
telling. The streets, schools, and towns named after him are too
numerous to mention, and there is at least one hotel. There is
Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and
Marshall University in Huntington, West Virginia, named in his
honor, it would appear, more for his conservative role in the
Virginia constitutional convention of 1829-1830 than for his
constitutional nationalism. There is the John Marshall School
of Law in Chicago, the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in
Cleveland, Ohio, and William and Mary's Marshall-Wythe School of
Law in Williamsburg, Virginia. Numerous clubs, scholarships,
fellowships, and honorary distinctions of various sorts bear his
name. His portraits, painted by the great painters of the age, as well
as countless imitators, are everywhere: in the beautiful East
Room of the Supreme Court Building, at various other places of
prominence in the nation's capital, and almost invariably in the
country's leading law schools. Marshall's likenesses in marble and
bronze appear in almost every size and shape, from larger-than-life
statues to affordable desk-size replicas. There is a much-admired,
and much-imitated, bust by Hiram Powers. On a grander scale is
William Wetmore Story's great figure of Marshall the lawgiver, once
located on the front lawn of the Capitol and now resting in a place
of honor in the Supreme Court Building. A recent larger-thanlife bronze by William Bahrends adorns the central campus of
Marshall University. The list goes on, from the commemorative
John Marshall silver spoon, to the giant stained-glass window in
Saint John the Divine's Cathedral in New York City (where
Marshall joins Hammurabi, Solon, and Joseph Story), to the modern
commemorative postage stamps. After two centuries, it seems clear
Marshall belongs to the American people, in whose name he so often
spoke.
Leading political scientists, historians, and legal scholarsbeginning with Roscoe Pound's 1936 list of great American judges8 4
-have unanimously agreed with Beveridge, and with Holmes before
him and Story before him, that Marshall was the greatest of the
84. For various listings of great American judges, see John V. Orth, JohnMarshalland
the Rule of Law, 49 S.C. L. REV. 633, 633-49 (1998).
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great, a judge for all ages. Scholars attending the bicentennial of
Marshall's birth in 1955, sponsored by the College of William and
Mary, reaffirmed his greatness even while gaining critical perspective on it. 5 The recent outpouring of scholarship-starting first
and foremost with the publication of The Papersof John Marshall
at the College of William and Mary and ranging from dozens of
learned articles to superb short studies of his jurisprudence, major
biographies, and monumental volumes about his Court-is a tribute
to his stature and importance. The coming bicentennial of his
ascension to the Court will almost certainly consolidate his
reputation further by making it more generally known.
Given the tendency of scholars to revise, reconsider, and debunk,
it is remarkable that Marshall's reputation, unlike that of some of
his contemporaries, seems largely impervious to criticism. Nor have
changing times taken a toll. Consider the remarkable irony, for
example, that Marshall should have been so universally celebrated
in the late 1930s, exactly at the time the Supreme Court, often
citing his opinions in Gibbons and McCulloch for authority, was
fundamentally altering the nonregulatory, property-loving, individualistic society he valued. Taken out of context, Marshall's
memorable statement in McCulloch that the Constitution was
intended to meet the "varied crises of human affairs" 6 became
the hallmark of the new open-ended approach to constitutional
interpretation he would surely have opposed. What he would have
thought about the New Deal and the New Deal Court had he
actually lived to see them cannot be determined. But the historical
Marshall was closer to the "four horsemen of the Apocalypse" than
the post-1937 Court, which put a constitutional foundation under
the liberal, regulatory welfare state. Marshall feared undue
legislative meddling in economic matters; believed in the sanctity of
contract; in balanced, perhaps even dual, federalism; in stare
decisis; and in the meaning of language, which allowed him to
understand the intent of the Framers. None of these things he took
for granted as the foundation blocks of constitutional law had much
meaning after 1937. About the only point of real continuity between
85. The papers presented at the 1955 conference, with an introduction by Chief Justice
Earl Warren praising Marshall, are published in CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL: A
REAPPRAISAL (W. Melville Jones ed., 1956).
86. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819).
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his age and the modern one, it would seem, was that the Supreme
Court was still at the center of the constitutional process-and the
constitutional storm.
WHERE MYTH AND REALITY INTERSECT: THE "GREAT CHIEF
JUSTICE" AND THE SUPREME COURT

No one would argue that the American Revolution, either in its
origins or conclusion, was monolithically constitutional in nature,

but recent scholarship shows that constitutional ideas permeated
every aspect of it, even the fighting. Among the world's great
revolutions, none was more productive of legal ideas and institutions. Marshall tapped into the legal-constitutional dimension of
the Revolution in several ways-as a soldier, a lawyer-legislator in
Virginia, a ratifier of the Constitution, and then in the 1790s as a
Federalist defender of Revolutionary truth as he saw it. In that
turbulent partisan decade, he concluded that only constitutional law
and legal institutions could save the Republic from party-based,
states' rights radicalism. His jurisprudence rested on a Burkean
foundation, but unlike Burke, Marshall had to create legal
institutions rather than preserve them. Chance, contingency, and
the friendship of John Adams gave him the opportunity to do so. As
Chief Justice, he brought the republican and conservative legal
legacy of the Revolution to bear on the institutional development of
the Supreme Court. Never in American history was Emerson's
statement more apt, that "an institution is the lengthened shadow
of one man."87
Despite the impression conveyed by worshipful biographers and
the allegations of his enemies, Marshall did not create the Supreme
Court singlehandedly any more than he originated judicial review.
Wisely, he built on the English common tradition of rule of law.
More specifically, he consulted the Framers themselves-building
on the logic of Article 3, which put a constitutional foundation under
the Court and connected it directly to the sovereign people, and of
Article 6, which made the Constitution supreme law of the land. He
drew heavily on the Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly gave the
87. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES (1841), as quoted in
AMIERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF ANEICAN QUOTATIONS 248 (1997).
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Court the authority to review state judicial decisions regarding
federal questions, and on the Process Acts of the 1790s, which
outlined the Court's mode of operation. More directly, he built on
the formative labors of the Jay and Ellsworth Courts, which
bequeathed to him a functioning institution of great potential.
Marbury is a case in point. The genius of that opinion was the fact
that it was not boldly original or doctrinally conclusive. Rather,
Marshall built from existing materials, -seized the appropriate
moment to act, and stated only so much as the moment allowed and
no more. For all of its political savvy, the decision promised that the
Court would be a legal, not a political, institution. Probably no
modem scholar would insist that Marshall was entirely immune
from the politics that swirled around him in that case or in others.
Often, to reach the law, he had to think and behave politically, if for
no other reason than to fend off his enemies. But even in its most
"political moments--Marbury comes to mind, as does McCulloch,
and the Georgia Cherokee cases -- the Court's "politics" differed
fundamentally from those of Congress and the Executive Branch.
More than any other institution that competed for power and the
respect of the American people during the early Republic, the Court
under Marshall embodied the first principle of republican
government-that law, not men, should rule. It was a principle
associated unavoidably with the intent of the Framers.
It is a bit heretical these days to argue that there was a time
when the Framers' intent had real meaning, but there was such a
time, and the phrase did have such. Marshall referred to intent in
his opinions; he believed what he said, and what he said and
believed was grounded in the history of the period. It is the
historical reality of intent, more even than his unique concept of
nationalism or his concept of balanced federalism, that locates
Marshall in his own age and distinguishes his jurisprudence from
ours. Modern constitutional relativism is part of a pervasive
cultural cynicism that looks skeptically on systems of moral values
and doubts the "meaning of meaning," to quote the title of the 1923
work that helped launch linguistic indeterminacy in modem legal

88. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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theory.8 9 More important than indeterminacy in language, physics,
ethics, and philosophy in producing legal relativism, however, has
been the constantly shifting meaning given to the Constitution by
a constantly shifting and highly politicized Supreme Court. It is
hard to believe that the words of the Constitution reveal one true
meaning when they have been cited to support such diverse things
as laissez-faire capitalism, the New Deal corporate welfare state,
and the modern revolution in civil rights. The changing Court that
molded the same Constitution to such changing policy goals cannot
persuasively claim to be above politics. The fact that Marshall is
seemingly cited on both sides of every question-and sometimes, as
in United States v. Lopez,' in the same case-seems to implicate
him in our indeterminate and highly politicized legal culture,
especially since the charge of politics was leveled against him
during his own age.9 '
While those allegations cannot be entirely disregarded, it is
instructive to recall that the lawyers, jurists, and politicians of
Marshall's age, even those who accused him of being political,
believed that the Constitution had a true meaning. For them, one
interpretation of the Constitution was not as good as the next. This
is not to say Marshall and his contemporaries believed the Founding
Fathers spoke with absolute clarity about everything. He was not a
constitutional literalist. But he did believe a single constitutional
meaning could be derived from the text, even when it was not
immediately clear what meaning the Framers intended. Two
interrelated things help account for his faith in the possibility of an
objective interpretation ofconstitutional language. The first was the
common-law tradition of statutory interpretation he shared with
other lawyers and judges of the period. The second was a naturallaw interpretive tradition that was deeply rooted in Western
history, one that included and informed the thinking of continental
and English jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
89. C.K OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE
OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM (1923).

90. 514 U.S. 549(1995).
91. For some of the best current scholarship on the problem of original intent, see
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1990). For the sharp disagreement among the Justices over Marshall's opinion in Gibbons,
see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-619.
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such as Grotius, Vattel, Rutherford, and Blackstone. Marshall
appeared to accept without question, and without careful examination, their collective belief that law had an objective existence
and that its meaning could be ascertained by time-tested rules of
interpretation, the same point Story extracted from Marshall's
opinions in his Commentaries on the Constitution.2 Marshall's use
of intentin his opinions was not a smoke screen designed to hide his
policy preferences or the lawmaking implications of his opinions but
rather emanated from his belief in the fundamental assumptions of
the early national legal culture.93
This is not to say Marshall claimed to have read the minds of the
Framers; he did not. Nor could he have, since the records of the
Philadelphia Convention and the state ratifying conventions were
not available to him. What he did have-and it was basic to the
meaning of intent, as he used the concept-was a consanguinity to
the Framers. Belonging to the first generation of interpreters,
"being there" at the beginning, had advantages other than getting
to write on a clean slate. One of the greatest was that Marshall
and his colleagues were asked to supply constitutional answers
to the same questions addressed by the Framers. No axiom of
constitutional interpretation was more decisive for Marshall than
reference to the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, the
same that the Constitution was designed to correct. Marshall not
only shared a common interpretive tradition with the Framers,
then, he shared the political history from which the Constitution
was fashioned. To understand what this meant, and how it
separates his age from ours, one has only to compare the effort of
the Marshall Court to settle matters concerning contracts, paper
money, slavery, and the emerging national market with those of the
modern Court asked to find authority for desegregation, abortion
rights, gay rights, and equal voting rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment of 1868, which was designed primarily to grant a
modicum of civil equality to newly freed slaves.
92. STORY, supra note 43.
93. The common-law tradition of interpretation is discussed brilliantly by H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885-948 (1985),
reprintedin INTERPRETINGTHE CONSTITUTION, supra note 91, at 53-116. Robert Lowry Clinton
explores the broader natural-law interpretive tradition in ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND

MAN IN THE LAw: THE FOUNDATIONS OF ANGLO-AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
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Marshall not only consolidated the power ofthe Court to interpret
the Constitution (the real meaning ofjudicial review), then, but he
did so when it was possible to ascertain with some assurance what
the words of the Constitution meant. One cannot claim Marshall
was omniscient or that everything he did was equally circumscribed
by the text of the Constitution. Least confining was international
law, which permitted Marshall and the Court to fashion a body of
law that blended market-oriented policy with the natural-law
tradition of the continental jurists, the same he consulted for rules
of interpretation. The constitutional text did not define Native
American "nations" either, which led Marshall to forge doctrine from
experience, custom, and history, the same things the Framers
consulted. What is striking, even in Marshall's most creative
moments, is how closely his view of federalism followed the contours
laid down in the Constitution. Who except the radical states'
rightists could deny that the Constitution was a document meant to
"energize" the national government, to give it the powers governments of a sovereign nation ordinarily have. This meant curbing
state power to issue paper money, to destroy contracts, and, in
general, to obstruct the growth of a national market. The Framers
took on state sovereignty, as the ratifying debates conclusively
show, and Marshall followed their lead. His jurisprudence, like
theirs, also recognized the historical limits of nationalism, leaving
a large reservoir of traditional power in the hands of the states,
including control over the institution of slavery. His concept of
federalism, like that of Madison and the other Framers, was not a
perfectly tidy arrangement, but neither was early national history.94
Recognizing Marshall's deep affinity with the Framers helps
locate him in the sweep of American history. His lack of originality,
which troubled Holmes, is not a problem but a virtue. What
Marshall did was to work creatively within the framework provided
by the Framers. By expounding, legitimating, and maintaining their
ideas, his opinions and their Constitution came to be perceived as
one and the same. Great symbolic advantage accrued in this fact for
both Marshall and the Court, but there was a problem. The problem
94. Jack N. Rakove does justice to the historical complexities of constitution making,
including Madison's federalism, in his ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).
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was that the Framers' Constitution, which he approached legally,
was also partly political. It was the supreme law of the land, as
Article 6 proclaims, and a bundle of political compromises-between
large states and small, between the free states and the slave
states, and, indeed, between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.
Marshall made his constitutional debut in Marbury by casting the
Court as a legal institution, and he expanded and justified its
powers building on that premise. But the political features of
the Constitution could not be readily legalized, especially the
compromise between states' rights and nationalism that permeated
so much of it. It was that part of the Constitution the political
branches claimed as their domain; it was that part the parties of
Jefferson and Jackson were bent on privileging. Having lost in the
battle for ratification, the defenders of states' rights and localism
retreated to fight over interpretation. They had some considerable
history on their side. One might even argue that local culture, which
lay at the basis of states' rights theory, was always dominant; that
the nationalism of the Constitution was a creation of a handful of
bold visionaries who seized the brief window of opportunity created
by Revolution. It was not just that the Constitution was "a roof
without walls" but that it was superimposed on a culture that was
essentially local and would remain so for decades. Marshall
understood the problem but hoped that the memory of the
Revolution and the growing economic advantages of national union
and national market would forge permanent bonds for the Union.
Ironically, it was the growth of a national market and national
capitalism located mainly in the North that fueled the southern
states' rights movement, leading to the Civil War and putting
Marshall on the losing side of antebellum history.
To recognize that Marshall was somehow an accomplice in his
own undoing is to acknowledge that he was not a status quo
conservative. To be sure, his belief in the intent of the Framers puts
him back in the Revolutionary War period. But the Revolution was
not simply the conservative law-abiding event Marshall thought it
was, nor was the Constitution that completed the Revolution
exclusively conservative in its meaning and operation. The
document that laid the conservative foundations of judicial review
also contained the seeds of popular democracy, without the benefit
of amendment, just as the Revolution set in motion the egalitarian
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transformation of American society. Likewise, the growth of
national commerce, which the Constitution promoted, transformed
the way Americans lived. Also the sovereign people continued to
play an active role in constitution making. Marshall approved of
them and cited them copiously when they created the Constitution
of 1787. When they took charge of constitutional change in the
1820s, however, it was another matter; when they took over the
Court, through the appointment process, it looked to Marshall like
the beginning of the end.
What this popular shift in constitutional law meant, among other
things-what Marshall witnessed in his last years and what the
Taney Court completed-was that the Supreme Court did not have
a monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Doctrines change over
time and sometimes disappear, even Marshall's. As modern scholars
have shown, it is not always the Court that initiates the changes.
The bitter lesson Jefferson and Jackson taught Marshall was that
the Court does not have the final word on the Constitution.
Understandably, he concluded that a changed Court was no Court
at all. What he did not fully appreciate was that the Court as an
institution did not have to be final to remain at the center of
American constitutional government. More than any other man,
Marshall put it there-by associating it with the Revolution,
through his person; with the Constitution, through the intent of the
Framers; and by making it work as an institution. Holmes put the
matter in words:
When we celebrate Marshall we celebrate at the same time and
indivisibly the inevitable fact that the oneness ofthe nation and
the supremacy of the national Constitution were declared to
govern the dealings of man with man by judgments and decrees
of the most august of courts. 5
The great Chief Justice put his stamp on the Court as an
institution, and when the Court goes about its work, it keeps his
fame alive. No other institution of government is so well-equipped
to perform this chore. To be sure, the other branches celebrate
themselves, too. Presidents occasionally cite other presidents, and

95. Holmes, supra note 3, at 268.

1494

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1463

political parties search for presidential forebears. The Senate and
the House are mindful of their own heroes and their own traditions.
But stare decisis, along with Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis, makes John
Marshall uniquely relevant. Over its long history, the Supreme
Court has cited Marshall's great opinions thousands of times.
Sometimes the opinions cited have been misunderstood, and
sometimes they have been cited to further policy goals that would
have made the old Chief Justice cringe. But his name and his ideas
still command attention in the actual work of the Court as it serves
the American nation he loved.

